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Abstract—Graph convolutional neural networks, which learn
aggregations over neighbor nodes, have achieved great per-
formance in node classification tasks. However, recent studies
reported that such graph convolutional node classifier can be
deceived by adversarial perturbations on graphs. Abusing graph
convolutions, a node’s classification result can be influenced
by poisoning its neighbors. Given an attributed graph and a
node classifier, how can we evaluate robustness against such
indirect adversarial attacks? Can we generate strong adversarial
perturbations which are effective on not only one-hop neighbors,
but more far from the target? In this paper, we demonstrate
that the node classifier can be deceived with high-confidence by
poisoning just a single node even two-hops or more far from the
target. Towards achieving the attack, we propose a new approach
which searches smaller perturbations on just a single node far
from the target. In our experiments, our proposed method shows
99% attack success rate within two-hops from the target in two
datasets. We also demonstrate that m-layer graph convolutional
neural networks have chance to be deceived by our indirect
attack within m-hop neighbors. The proposed attack can be
used as a benchmark in future defense attempts to develop graph
convolutional neural networks with having adversary robustness.
Index Terms—adversarial attack, data poisoning, graph con-
volutional neural network, node classification
I. INTRODUCTION
Graph is a core component for many important applications
ranging from recommendations and customer type analysis
in social networks to anomaly detection, behavior analysis in
sensor networks [31] [6]. Even if graph is not explicitly given,
estimated latent graph can be helpful for those applications
because the graph gives them relationships and interactions
between nodes [9] [26] [13]. One of the most frequently
applied tasks on graph data is node classification: given a
single large attributed graph and the class labels of subset of
nodes in the graph, how to predict the labels of the remaining
nodes.
The last years, deep neural networks for large graphs have
achieved great performance in node classification problems
[14] [10] [30]. One of the well-known approaches in node
classification is graph convolutional neural networks (GCNs).
GCNs utilize not only node features, but relational information
on graph to perform classification task.
On the other hand, recent years many researchers noticed
that deep learning architectures can easily be fooled [24]. Even
only slight, deliberate perturbations, it can lead a machine
∗This paper is the full version of [25].
Fig. 1: Indirect adversarial attack by poisoning a single node.
Poisoned information is propagated through graph and influ-
ences other nodes’ classification results.
learning model to misclassification [3] [1]. The perturbation
is called adversarial perturbation and a sample with the
perturbation is known to adversarial example. The adversarial
examples is a potentially critical safety issues in any machine
learning based systems. Therefore studies about generating
adversarial examples are important to evaluate robustness of
the target machine learning models [7] [22] [5] [11]. As well
as typical deep learning architectures, GCNs are also highly
vulnerable in adversarial perturbations [33].
Against typical neural networks, adversarial perturbations
for GCNs have several particular characteristics. First, we can
add perturbations on both features and edges. Second, we
can lead misclassification by not only direct perturbations on
the target, but indirect perturbations on the target’s neighbors.
[33] proposed an adversarial perturbation method to perform
both direct and indirect attacks for GCNs in semi-supervised
learning setting. The indirect attack iteratively perturbs either
a feature or an edge for given number of 1-hop neighbors.
Additionally, we consider about another possibility of ad-
versarial examples on graphs. A series of graph convolutions
delivers nodes’ information through series of edges. Thus, even
if there is no direct connection, the poisoned information pos-
sibly influence a node far from the poisoned node. Hence, not
only around directly connected neighbors, but we also consider
about adversary robustness against such indirect attacks from
remote nodes. Further, to evaluate the upper bound of the
robustness of GCNs, we need an attack which is sufficiently
strong to deceive them. A strong attack against GCNs is
perturbations on few nodes far from the target. To evaluate
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the robustness of node classifiers with graph convolutions, we
need a method to generate such strong indirect perturbations.
In this work, we attempt to close the gaps. The question
we want to solve is: given an attributed graph and its node
classifier with GCN layers, how can we craft high-confidence
adversarial perturbation which leads misclassification into a
target node thorough poisoning a single node far from the
target? Towards evaluating adversary robustness of GCNs, the
problem addressed here has significant importance.
Present Work. To answer these questions, we introduce an
adversarial perturbation method POISONPROBE which poisons
just a single node’s features to lead misclassification into a
target node far more than one-hop from the poisoned node.
The proposed method enable us to evaluate GCNs’ robustness
against indirect adversarial perturbations.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contributions:
1) We introduce a new attack named POISONPROBE which
deceive node classifiers with GCN. POISONPROBE poi-
sons a node’s features to lead misclassification into a
target far more than 1-hop from the poisoned node.
2) We also introduce an approach to find the poisoning
node that has high chance to result in the smallest
perturbations than other candidates.
3) Our proposed attack is significantly more effective than
previous approach. In our experiments, proposed method
with poisoning randomly selected node shows at least
92% attack success rate within two-hops from the target
for two datasets. Further, the proposed method with the
poisoning node selection shows 99% attack success rate
at two-hops.
4) We reveal that m-layer GCNs have chance to be de-
ceived by our attack within m-hops from the target.
The proposed attack can be used as a benchmark in future de-
fense attempts to develop graph convolutional neural networks
with having adversary robustness.
II. RELATED WORK
Deep Learning for Graphs. Researches of deep learning for
graphs can be distinguished in two parts: node embeddings [8]
[20] [2] and graph neural networks [14] [13] [10]. We focus
on the latter, especially graph convolutional neural networks
(GCNs) and adversarial attacks for them.
While many classical approaches have been introduced
in the past, the last years, deep neural networks for large
graphs have achieved great performance in node classification
problems [30]. The core idea behind GCNs is to learn how to
aggregate feature information over local graph neighborhoods
using neural networks. A single graph convolution operation
aggregates feature information over a node’s one-hop neigh-
bors on a graph, and by stacking multiple those convoluted
information can be propagated through the graph.
Under such GCNs, as well as typical deep learning archi-
tectures, GCNs are also vulnerable in adversarial perturbations
[33]. This paper also tackles crafting adversarial perturbations
under GCNs, but focus on indirect perturbations on a node far
from a target node.
Adversarial Examples. Adversarial example is a crafted input
for deceiving deep neural networks [24]. It is a potentially
critical safety issues in machine learning based systems.
Therefore, we need to evaluate adversary robustness at de-
veloping machine learning models. One of simple defense
approach against adversarial examples is to mask gradients
[19]. However, it provides a false sense of security [3] [1].
Adversarial training [16], which injects adversarial examples
with correct labels into training samples, is a simple way to
re-train a model. Recently, several certified robust learning
approaches have been proposed [28] [18] [27]. The certified
defense mechanisms practically do not have enough robustness
at all, but give certifiable robustness around training points.
On the other hands, studies about generating adversarial
examples / perturbations are important to evaluate robustness
of the target machine learning models [22] [5] [11] [29].
The most well known method is FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign
Method) [7]. FGSM finds adversarial perturbations optimized
for the L∞ distance metric. FGSM is a light-weight method
to craft adversarial perturbations. Thus, it is a standard way
to try finding adversarial examples. [15] proposed an iterative
approach extending FGSM. Deepfool is an untargeted attack
optimized for the L2 distance metric in an efficient way. CW
Attack [3] discovers an adversarial perturbation with small
size of perturbations. CW Attack has variants for the L0,
L2 and L∞ distance metrics. This paper we assume L2 for
CW Attack. CW Attack is used as a standard benchmark of
adversary robustness of neural networks.
Adversarial Perturbations on Graphs. Works on adversarial
attacks for graph learning tasks are only a few works. [4]
introduced an adversarial attack which exploits reinforce-
ment learning ideas through deleting edges. [34] proposed
untargeted attack for graph via meta learning. [33] proposed
Nettack which is a crafting adversarial perturbation on graph to
deceive its node classifier through perturbing both features and
edges. Nettack can deceive a node’s classification result in two
ways: direct and indirect. Nettack’s direct attack perturbs both
features and edges of the target node. While indirect attack
called influencer attack picks the target’s 1-hop neighbors
(called influencer nodes), then iteratively perturbs either a
feature or an edge of influencer nodes with in budget of
perturbations. Nettack prefers to choose a feature to perturb
in early iterations, because adding/removing edge can close to
successful adversarial example than perturbing a single fea-
ture. The one by one perturbations for features is not powerful
to find successful adversarial examples. On the other hand,
the perturbations of Nettack seem data poisonings on a graph
aiming to deceive node classifiers. [32] proposed robust graph
convolutional networks (RGCN) against adversarial attacks.
Difference against Existing Works. In this paper we mainly
study on adversarial perturbations on a single node far from the
target more than one-hop, whereas Nettack perturbs multiple
one-hop neighbors for indirect attacks. Since typical GCNs
have two-layers of graph convolutions, there is chance to
deliver poisoned feature information from two-hops and more.
Our goal is to clarify a potential vulnerability of GCNs, and
make more strong attack for evaluating adversary robustness
of GCNs. Such strong attacks are important to measure the
robustness of GCNs including RGCN [32]. We also assume
no changes on graph structure. We have many applications
assuming stable graph. Sensor network is one of those appli-
cations. We here study about vulnerability of GCNs under the
assumption of no structural changes. Further, Our study do
not explicitly assume the perturbation budget which Nettack
introduced, but the proposed method can perform like having
the budget by rejecting the results over the budget.
III. PRELIMINARY
We consider the task of (semi-supervised) node classifi-
cation in a single large graph having binary node features.
Formally, let G = (X,A) be an attributed graph, where A ∈
Rn×n is the adjacency matrix representing the connections and
X ∈ Rn×d represents the nodes’ features.
a) Node Classification with GCNs.: GCN (Graph Convo-
lutional Neural Network) is a semi-supervised learning method
to classify nodes, given feature matrix X , adjacency matrix A
and labels for subset of nodes in the graph. We have several
variants of GCN, but we assume the most common way [14].
The GCN is defined as follows:
H(l+1) = σ(D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2H(l)W (l))
where A˜ = A+ IN , IN is the identity matrix, D˜ii =
∑
j A˜ij ,
H(0) = X and σ is an activation function. We assume
σ(x) = ReLU(x). Here, let f(X,A) be the output of
neural network f with Softmax layer, and we denote logits
Z(X,A) that is the output before Softmax layer as f(X,A) =
Softmax(Z(X,A)). A commonly used application is two-
layer GCN. That is, Z(X,A) = Aˆσ(AˆXW (0))W (1) , where
Aˆ = D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 .
b) Adversarial Examples against GCNs.: We introduce
adversarial examples on graph against GCNs. Let positive ad-
versarial example be an adversarial example which satisfies
the following condition:
max
i6=t
(Z(X ′, A)u,i)− Z(X ′, A)u,t < 0 (1)
where Z(X ′, A)u,i is u’ logit value of class i. Positive
adversarial examples cause misclassification into the target
node u to be the target class t. Untargeted attack is also
described as:
Z(X ′, A)u,c −max
i 6=c
(Z(X ′, A)u,i) < 0 (2)
where c is u’s legitimate output f(X,A)u.
c) Box Constraints.: We ensure the modification by
adversarial perturbations yields a valid input, we have a
constraint on modification δ as 0 ≤ x+ δ ≤ 1. [3] introduced
following change-of-variables:
x+ δ =
1
2
(tanh(w) + 1). (3)
Since −1 ≤ tanh(w) ≤ 1, it follows that 0 ≤ x + δ ≤ 1.
In the above notation, we can optimize over w to find valid
solution with a smoothing effect of clipped gradient descent
that eliminates the problem of getting stuck in extreme regions.
This method allows us to use an optimization algorithm that
does not natively support box constraints. We also employ
Adam optimizer [12] with this box constraints in our attack.
IV. PROPOSED NODE POISONING
Given the node classification setting described in section
III, our goal is to find small perturbations on features of a
node on a graph G = (X,A) and simultaneously to lead
misclassification into the other node even when those two
nodes have no direct connection. Hence, we assume u 6= v,
where u is the target node and v is the node which we add the
perturbations. We also assume no structural changes on graph.
To solve the problem above, an optimization based approach
is introduced in section IV-A. We also introduce poisoning
node selection that discovers the poisoning node that has
high chance to result in the smallest perturbations than other
candidates (section IV-B).
A. POISONPROBE
Here we propose a new attack POISONPROBE that solves
the above problem. The objective function POISONPROBE
solves is defined as
L(x′v, u, t, λ) = ||xv − x′v||2 + λ · g(X ′, u, t) (4)
g(X ′, u, t) =
(
max
i6=t
(Z(X ′, A)u,i)− Z(X ′, A)u,t
)
+
(5)
where xv is feature vector of v, x′v = xv + δv , δv represents
perturbations on xv , t is the target class label, X ′ = X+eTv ·δv ,
ev ∈ {0, 1}n is an unit vector that v-th element is 1 and (·)+ =
max(·, 0). We then try to solve the following optimization
problem to find the high-confidence adversarial perturbations
on v targeting u.
x∗v = argmin
x′v
L(x′v, u, t, λ)
In the optimization, we employ the transformation (3) for
x′v to find valid solution with a smoothing effect of clipped
gradient descent that eliminates the problem of getting stuck
in extreme regions. To find indirect adversarial perturbations,
we need to estimate gradient of L(wv, u, t, λ) over wv which
is a transformed variable from x′v = xv + δv . In case the
connection between u and v is indirect, perturbation on v is
propagated via graph convolution into v with damping. Hence,
it is not easy to find the solution that turn u’s output into the
targeted class. To find the valid solution satisfying (5), we
employ binary search for discovering effective value of λ.
The detail algorithm of POISONPROBE is described in
Algorithm 1. The proposed algorithm consists of outer loop
and inner loop. The inner loop discovers smaller perturbations
which can achieve desired targeted attack under the several
parameters are fixed. Then, the outer loop discovers the
parameters iteratively by utilizing binary search. If the inner
loop successfully find the adversarial perturbation, it decrease
the constant λ. While, if the inner loop cannot find it, it
Algorithm 1: POISONPROBE
Input: feature matrix X , adjacency matrix A, target
node u, target class t, poisoning node v
Output: adversarial example x∗v
Parameter: λinit, λmin init, λmax init, learning rate γ,
max search steps, max iter
1 λ← λinit; λmax ← λmax init; λmin ← λmin init
2 x˜v ← arctanh(xv)
3 min dist ←∞
4 for step = 1 to max search steps do
5 is found adversarial ← false
6 for i = 1 to max iter do
7 wv ← wv − γ∇wvL(wv, u, t, λ)
8 x′v ← 12 (tanh(x˜v + wv) + 1)
9 dist ← ||xv − x′v||2
10 if g(X ′, u, t) < 0 then
11 if dist < min dist then
12 x∗v ← x′v
13 min dist ← dist
14 is found adversarial ← true
15 if is found adversarial then
16 λmax ← λ
17 else
18 λmin ← λ
19 λ← 12 (λmin + λmax)
20 return x∗v
increase λ, that means it focuses on finding perturbations
satisfying (5) rather than reducing size of perturbations next.
B. Poisoning Node Selection
Here we discuss about how to choose the poisoning nodes
to achieve the misclassification with smaller perturbations. On
a graph convolutional neural network, a graph convolution
layer aggregates features of both a (center) node and its 1-
hop neighbors. Here we assume every 1-hop neighbor can
equally deliver its features to the center node u through graph
convolution.
Definition 1: (Poisoning efficiency of 1-hop neighbor) Let
N (1)u be the set of 1-hop neighbors around u. Poisoning
efficiency of v ∈ N (1)u to lead misclassification towards u
is defined by
φ(1)u (v) =
1
|N (1)u |
. (6)
Next, we consider about the poisoning efficiency of a node
far more than 1-hop. To simplify, we only consider shortest
paths that are paths ignoring edges between nodes where are
the same distance from the target. This simplification enables
us to transform the graph into the tree whose root is the target
u. We call the tree neighborhood tree.
Definition 2: (Poisoning efficiency of m-hop neighbor) Let
N (m)u be the set of m-hop neighbors around u and ancu(v)
(a) Poisoning at 2-hop neighbors (b) Neighborhood Tree
Fig. 2: Transformation from graph to neighbor tree. We want
to choose the most efficient poisoning node from the 2-hop
neighbors (pink) of the target (blue). We transform the graph
(a) into the neighbor tree (b) to easily discover ancestor of
candidates nodes and shortest paths towards the target.
be the ancestor node of v in the neighborhood tree whose
root is u. Poisoning efficiency of v ∈ N (m)u (m > 1) to lead
misclassification towards u is defined as
φ(m)u (v) =
∑
η∈ancu(v)
1
|N (1)η |
φ(m−1)u (η) (7)
where
φ(1)u (η) = 1. (8)
Actually (6) is better interpretation of poisoning efficiency
of a 1-hop neighbor than (8). However we utilize (8) for
poisoning efficiency of a m-hop neighbor because (6) is the
equivalent for all 1-hop neighbors.
The score of poisoning efficiency defined the above looks
like band-width of the path delivering poisoned information
from the candidate to the target. If the score is small, the
poisoned information will be shrunk through the path. There-
fore, we need to enlarge the poisoned information to achieve
the adversarial attack. While if we can select the path whose
poisoning efficiency is high, we have chance to reduce the
amount of perturbations to do it.
From u’s m-hop neighbors N (m)u , we pick a node which
has the maximum poisoning efficiency:
v∗ = arg max
v∈N (m)u
φ(m)u (v). (9)
In case there is multiple nodes having the maximum poison-
ing efficiency, we randomly select one node from them. For the
1-hop neighbors, we always randomly pick a node from N (1)u
because all the candidates share the same poisoning efficiency.
V. EXTENSIONS
We here describe simple extensions of POISONPROBE.
A. Extension 1: Multiple Node Perturbation
We introduce an extension to perturb multiple nodes. We
here describe the difference fom the original POISONPROBE.
1) Targeted Perturbation: The formulation of the problem
we solve here is described as follows:
minimize ||XV −X ′V ||2
such that argmax(Z(X ′, A)u) = t
where XV is feature matrix of V . V includes poisoning nodes
{v1, . . . , v|V |}. The loss function (4) is rewritten as:
L(X ′V , u, t, λ) = ||XV −X ′V ||2 + λ · g(X ′, u, t).
We can also employ Algorithm (1) to discover perturbations
on {v1, . . . , v|V |}.
2) Multiple Node Selection: If we desire to perturb k
nodes, a simple solution is to choose the node having the best
poisoning efficiency from the rest of candidates k times.
B. Extension 2: Suppression of Infections
This is an extension of POISONPROBE. Whenever adding
perturbations on a node, there is possibilities to propagate the
poisoned information through graph convolutions. We call this
unfortunate propagation infections.
To mitigate the number of infected nodes, we introduce a
penalty into (4). The penalty is defined as:
p(X ′) =
∑
q∈Q
(
max
i6=t
(Z(X ′, A)q,i)− Z(X ′, A)q,c
)
+
(10)
where Q is a set of nodes except u and v, c is non-deceived
output label. This is the penalty to add loss if the output label is
changed via the perturbations. Finally, we solve the following
objective function:
L∗(x′v, u, t, λ, β) = L(x′v, u, t, λ) + β · p(X ′). (11)
VI. EVALUATION
This section demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed
attack POISONPROBE with two datasets. The experimental
evaluations were designed to answer following questions:
• How successful is our method in leading misclassification
into node classifiers with GCNs?
• How far nodes can our method perform success from?
• How successful is our method in choosing the poison-
ing node which achieve adversarial attack with smaller
perturbations?
a) Dataset: As well as [33], we utilize CORA-ML [17]
and CiteSeer networks as in [21], whose characteristics are
described in Table I. We split the network in labeled (20%)
and unlabeled nodes (80%). We further split the labeled nodes
in equal parts training and validation sets to train the node
classifiers which our attack try to deceive.
b) Model architectures: We employ well-known graph
convolutional neural networks, GCN with two graph convo-
lutional layers with semi-supervised setting described above
[14] 1. In the following evaluations, we also use GCNs with
3 layers and 4 layers. The detail of the model architectures of
the those GCNs are described in Table II. In the training for
those GCNs, we set learning rate is 0.01, dropout rate is 0.5.
We iterate training within 200 epochs.
1https://github.com/tkipf/pygcn
#nodes #edges #features #classes
CORA-ML [17] 2708 13264 1433 7
CiteSeer [21] 3312 12384 3703 6
TABLE I: Dataset
Layer Type GCN(2) GCN(3) GCN(4)
GConv + ReLU (d) X X X
GConv + ReLU (256) X
GConv + ReLU (64) X X
GConv (16) X X X
Softmax (#classes) X X X
TABLE II: Model Architectures
c) Setting of Our Attack: Our attack POISONPROBE iter-
atively searches adversarial perturbations with smaller size of
modifications by binary search. We set max search steps=9,
max iter=1000, λinit = 1.0, λmax init = 109, λmin init = 0,
where max search steps represents number of binary search
steps, λinit represents initial value of λ. We developed POI-
SONPROBE in Python 3.6 and PyTorch 1.0.0.
d) Competitor: We employ Nettack’s indirect attack [33]
to compare effectiveness with proposed attack. The indirect at-
tack automatically chooses given number of influencer nodes,
which are nodes around the target. We set the number of
influencer nodes as 1. Since Nettack perturbs number of
features within given budget, we utilize linear search to find
positive adversarial examples. The linear search iteratively
increase the budget from 1 while score (2) is decreased and
positive adversarial is not found.
A. Attack Success Rate
Here we answer the question: How successful is our method
in leading misclassification into the target node from its
neighbors?
To evaluate the effectiveness of our POISONPROBE, we
measure attack success rate which is the fraction of positive
adversarial examples whose size of perturbations are less than
threshold. The attack success rate success(θ) is defined as
follows:
success(θ) =
|{x′i ∈ X ′|dist(xi, x′i) < θ}|
|X|
where dist(xi, x′i) = ||xi − x′i||2.
We measure the attack success rates for each distance of
poisoning neighbors. To measure the attack success rates,
we crafted 200 adversarial perturbations through randomly
choosing triples of (target node, target class, poisoning node)
for each case. Here we do not employ the proposed poisoning
node selection.
We show the attack success rate under GCN(2) for Cora-
ML and CiteSeer in Figure 3 and Figure 3b respectively.
On the both figure we plot the attack success rates when
POISONPROBE poisons 1-hop neighbors (blue line) and 2-hop
neighbors (yellow line).
Attack Success Rate
Attack f 1-hop 2-hop 3-hop 4-hop
POISONPROBE GCN(2) 1.00 0.92 0.00 0.00
GCN(3) – – 0.54 0.00
GCN(4) – – – 0.17
Nettack GCN(2) 0.68 – – –
(a) CORA-ML
Attack Success Rate
Attack f 1-hop 2-hop 3-hop 4-hop
POISONPROBE GCN(2) 1.00 1.00 0.08 0.00
GCN(3) – – 0.87 0.06
GCN(4) – – – 0.64
Nettack GCN(2) 0.55 – – –
(b) CiteSeer
TABLE III: Overall Attack Success Rate. m-layer GCN could be deceived by POISONPROBE within m-hop neighbors.
(a) CORA-ML (b) CiteSeer
Fig. 3: Attack success rate of our indirect attack from single
poisoned neighbor. Adversary can fool any nodes in 2-hops
from the hijacked neighbor with high-confidence.
a) Observations: Figure 3 shows very high attack suc-
cess rates for both at 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors. In 1-hop
neighbors, even when the perturbation size is less 1.0(=100),
the attack success rate is more than 90 %. Poisoning 1-
hop neighbors also achieve complete attack success after the
perturbation is around 50. Adversarial perturbations on 2-hop
neighbors show 92 % attack success rate in total. The fact
that we can deceive any nodes’ classification results through
poisoning single node which have no direct connections be-
tween the target is very important. Figure 3b also shows very
high attack success rates. Both poisoning 1-hop and 2-hop
neighbors show complete attack success at the end. When
the perturbations is less than 1.0, 1-hop shows more than
95 % and 2-hop shows around 80 % attack success rate
respectively. Tables IIIa and IIIb shows overall attack success
rate compare with Nettack. Our attack shows higher success
rate than Nettack with 1-influencer setting which iteratively
perturbs a feature.
b) Discussion: Remarkable thing here is two-layers GCN
can be deceived classification results from poisoning nodes
at 2-hops far from the target node. We can say that GCNs
are vulnerable not only modifications of directly connecting
neighbors but nodes at 2-hops far. In social networks, 2-hops
neighbors are friends of friends. Most of them are unknown
instances that we do not care about. Thus, it is very hard to
notice about becoming a victim. Graph convolutional neural
networks are very powerful machine learning tools, but we
need to consider risks against adversarial perturbations.
(a) CORA-ML (b) CiteSeer
Fig. 4: Our poisoning node selection is effective. POISON-
PROBE with perturbing the node having the highest poisoning
efficiency shows significantly higher attack success rate.
B. Perturbations on Remote Nodes
Beyond 2-hops from the target, can POISONPROBE generate
positive adversarial perturbations?
a) Observations: Table IIIa and IIIb demonstrate the
attack success rates of poisoning 2-hop neighbors under
GCN(2), 3-hop neighbors under GCN(3) and 4-hop neighbors
under GCN(4). On CORA-ML, the success rate at 3-hops
under GCN(3) is more than 50 % while 0 under GCN(2).
Similarly, the success rate at 4-hops under GCN(4) is 17
% while 0 under GCN(2) and GCN(3). Fig 3 and 3b also
demonstrate the attack success rate along with the perturbation
size. Positive adversarials at 3-hops consumed much more
perturbations than 2-hops. Similarly, positive adversarials at
4-hops consumed lots of perturbations as well.
b) Discussions: Based on the above experimental results,
we can say that it is possible to craft possible adversarials
at nodes far from the target even when we built multi-layer
GCN, but POISONPROBE cannot craft positive adversarials in
high-confidence. We demonstrated that m-layer GCN could be
deceived within m-hop neighbors.
C. Effectiveness of Poisoning Node Selection
Here we answer the question: How successful is our method
in choosing the poisoning node which achieve adversarial
attack with smaller perturbations?
To evaluate the effectiveness of our poisoning node se-
lection, we measure the attack success rate success(θ) and
the average size of perturbations. We compare the attacks
which perturb top-1 node in poisoning efficiency, top-2 nodes,
top-3 nodes, bottom-1 and random from 2-hop neighbors
around each target. Result of top-k is made by the attacks
Fig. 5: Effectively discovered the smallest perturbation node.
perturbing nodes having top-k scores. Random is identical
to the result in Fig 3. In this evaluation, we crafted 200
adversarial perturbations through randomly choosing (target
node, target class) for each case as well.
a) Observation 1 (Success Rate with Node Selection):
In Figure 4a, POISONPROBE with choosing top-1 outperforms
the one with random selection and bottom-1. At the perturba-
tion size is 1.0, POISONPROBE with top-1 shows around 65
% success rate. It is higher than POISONPROBE with random
selection, which shows around 40 % in Figure 3. Figure 4b
also shows very high attack success rates. The differences
between the top-1 and the bottom-1 are also large. In Figure 4a
and 4b, POISONPROBE with poisoning top-2 and top-3 nodes
outperform the top-1. Those attacks enable us to craft higher
confidence attack at a level of perturbation. At the perturbation
size is 1.0, POISONPROBE with top-3 nodes shows over 80 %
success rate for both two data.
Next, to check the effectiveness of our poisoning node
selection, we measure recall in finding the node which give
us the smallest perturbation. Figure 5 shows the recall at
top k highest poisoning efficiency nodes. In this evaluation,
we randomly pick 200 target nodes. For each target, we
compare all attacks which perturb single node having different
poisoning efficiency in 2-hop neighbors. We attempt all attacks
using single poisoning node v chosen from Pu that satisfies
Pu = {p|φ(2)u (p) 6= φ(2)u (q) ∧ p 6= q ∧ p, q ∈ N (2)u }. Note
that, in our pre-study, the nodes sharing the same poisoning
efficiency tended to result in very similar size of perturbations.
b) Observation 2 (Recall in Discovering the Smallest
Perturbation Node): Figure 5 shows that 85% of attacks
achieved the smallest perturbations on Cora-ML, and 90% on
Citeseer. At top-2, our method got more than 96% recall.
We further evaluate rank correlation between ranks in poi-
soning efficiency and ranks in the size of perturbations. To
measure the rank correlation, we compute Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient [23] defined as follows:
rcc(u) =
6
∑
v∈Pu d
2
v
κu(κ2u − 1)
where dv is the difference between two ranks of v ∈ Pu and
κu = |Pu|. The output rcc(u) is within [-1,1]. +1 indicates a
perfect association, 0 indicates no association, -1 indicates a
perfect negative association between two ranks.
c) Observation 3 (Rank correlation between poisoning
efficiency and perturbation size): In Table IV, mean of the
mean std
CORA-ML 0.922 0.238
CiteSeer 0.962 0.121
TABLE IV: Rank correlation coefficient. Ranks in poisoning
efficiency and in perturbation sizes shows strong associations.
POISONPROBE median mean std. dev zeros
1-hop β = 0 4 11.28 23.37 0.02
β = 0.01 4 9.31 17.66 0.04
2-hop β = 0 13.5 22.24 43.90 0.00
β = 0.01 12.5 22.11 43.85 0.00
TABLE V: Infection Nodes
rank correlation between the rank of poisoning candidate
nodes in poisoning efficiency and in perturbation size are more
than 0.9. Thus, these two ranks have very strong association.
Therefore, our proposed method with the poisoning node
selection is effective to craft adversarial attacks with smaller
perturbations in many cases.
d) Discussions: From the above results, our method can
successfully choose the poisoning node which needs small
perturbations to deceive the node classifier. The proposed
poisoning node selection is a heuristic way with considering
how much information can be delivered from a candidate to
the target. Our simple, intuitive and light-weight node selection
helps POISONPROBE to achieve high-confident adversarial
perturbations with small noises.
D. Infections
We evaluate how many nodes are infected by the adversarial
perturbations. In the adversary’s view, smaller number of
infected nodes is better to conceal her malicious activity.
Table V shows statistics about number of infected nodes
when adding perturbations on 1-hop or 2-hop nodes. We also
measure the statistics with and without the penalty introduced
in (10). In case we turn on the penalty, we set β = 0.01
on (11). While, β = 0 represents proposed method with
no penalty. We evaluate number of infections for CORA-
ML dataset. Here we do not mention about CiteSeer dataset
because the results had very small number of infections.
First we look at the results without the penalty. Adversarial
attacks from 1-hop neighbors infect a few nodes. Attacks from
2-hop neighbors turn much more number of nodes into wrong
results than 1-hops. Next, we proceed into the POISONPROBE
with the penalty. For both 1-hop and 2-hop, the number of
infection nodes are decreased. In 1-hop, the number of zero
infections (that is zeros in Table V) are increased.
Since perturbation size of 2-hop neighbors’ attacks is larger
than 1-hop, the number of infection nodes is also increased.
Fortunately, POISONPROBE with the penalty can mitigate the
infections. However, it have not revealed significant benefits
yet. Finding more effective value of β needs more studies.
Table VIa and Table VIb show the average size of pertur-
bations (L2 loss), overall attack success rate, and number of
poisoning nodes success rate mean L2 loss mean #infec.
top 1 0.990 4.769 12.010
top 2 0.985 4.238 12.871
top 3 0.980 17.982 19.148
bottom 1 0.895 44.679 23.078
(a) CORA-ML
poisoning nodes success rate mean L2 loss mean #infec.
top 1 1.000 2.665 7.080
top 2 0.995 2.114 9.603
top 3 0.995 1.204 11.312
bottom 1 0.970 48.254 12.871
(b) CiteSeer
TABLE VI: POISONPROBE with the poisoning node selection shows higher attack success rate and smaller perturbations.
Number of infection nodes is increased when POISONPROBE perturb multiple nodes.
infections, for POISONPROBE with poisoning different types
of nodes. Those success rates are higher than POISONPROBE
with random choices (Table VIa and VIb) The size of pertur-
bations of top-1 is more than 10 times smaller than bottom-
1 for each data. When we perturb several nodes’ features,
POISONPROBE has much more chance to reduce the size of
perturbations because it may have more freedom to perturb.
However, number of infections are increased (Table VIa and
VIb).
VII. CONCLUSION
Towards evaluating adversary robustness of GCNs, we tack-
led the question; can we generate effective adversarial pertur-
bations on a node far from the target? We introduced a new
attack named POISONPROBE which poisons a node’s features
to lead misclassification into a target far more than one-hop.
We also introduced an approach to discover the poisoning
node with smaller perturbations. In our evaluations, attack
success rates of the proposed attack were at most 100% from
1-hop neighbors and 92% from two-hop neighbors in Cora-
ML dataset by poisoning single randomly selected node. The
proposed attack can be used as a benchmark in future defense
attempts to develop graph convolutional neural networks with
robustness against indirect adversarial perturbations.
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